feat(db-bootstrap): service DB credentials must be sealed in fuzeinfra namespace + bootstrap script

[izzywdev]

@claude

Priority: HIGH — production data loss risk. The fuzeinfra-namespace copies of the per-service DB password secrets (fuzesales-db-credentials, fuzecontact-db-credentials, fuzeservice-db-credentials) were created ad-hoc with kubectl create secret and are NOT in git. If the fuzeinfra namespace is ever deleted or re-provisioned from scratch, the provisioning Job will immediately wedge again (x26,000 CreateContainerConfigError — exactly what happened this week for ~4 days). Please consult Claude Opus 4.8 when deciding how to structure the long-term solution.

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Context: the two-secret pattern

The provisioning Job (service-db-provisioning.yaml) reads ONE secret per service from the fuzeinfra namespace — the service's DB password (key: password). This is separate from the full credentials secret in the app namespace (DATABASE_URL, DB_HOST, etc.) which ArgoCD syncs from each app repo's deploy/sealed-secrets/.

Current state of the fuzeinfra-namespace secrets:

Secret	Present in fuzeinfra ns	Sealed in git
fuzesales-db-credentials	✓ (ad-hoc)	✗
fuzecontact-db-credentials	✓ (ad-hoc)	✗
fuzeservice-db-credentials	✓ (ad-hoc)	✗
mendys-db-credentials	✓ (sealed, FuzeKeys #136 precedent)	✓

Mendys is the reference implementation. Do exactly what was done for mendys for the other three.

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What needs to be done

1. Add sealed secrets for the three services in this repo

For each of fuzesales, fuzecontact, fuzeservice: create a SealedSecret targeting the fuzeinfra namespace with just the password key, using the passwords currently live on the cluster:

fuzesales   password: Li1cTPDK5lj06rswzG6zzSHycNI9Mqx7
fuzecontact password: gCIh8rK7mcfJrOyNeSd707MHayVnm6r2
fuzeservice password: VJkk5y99q6K8hsfCW0EdzPoXDyGzutCp

Seal each with kubeseal --namespace fuzeinfra and commit to deploy/sealed-secrets/ (or wherever mendys-db-credentials.yaml lives — follow the same path). These must be applied before the provisioning Job runs on any fresh deployment.

2. Create scripts/seed-service-db.sh — the canonical bootstrap script

A reusable, idempotent script that does the full flow for any new service:

#!/usr/bin/env bash
# Usage: ./scripts/seed-service-db.sh <service-name> [<password>]
# If password is omitted, generates a 32-char random one.
# Creates:
#   1. SealedSecret for fuzeinfra namespace (password key only) → written to deploy/sealed-secrets/
#   2. Prints the password so the calling engineer can pass it to the app repo's own sealing step
# The calling engineer then runs the app repo's equivalent to seal the full DATABASE_URL secret.

The script should:

• Accept SERVICE_NAME and optional PASSWORD args
• Generate a secure 32-char password if none provided
• Run kubeseal against the live cluster to produce deploy/sealed-secrets/<service>-db-credentials-fuzeinfra.yaml
• Print clear instructions: "Now go to the repo and run ./scripts/seal-db-credentials.sh <password> to create the app-namespace sealed secret, then add the service to helm/fuzeinfra/values-contabo.yaml"
• Be idempotent (check if secret already exists on cluster before creating)

3. Update ONBOARD-REPO.md / docs/ with the canonical DB provisioning flow

Add a "Database provisioning" section documenting:

1. Run ./scripts/seed-service-db.sh <service> in FuzeInfra → get the password
2. Run the equivalent sealing step in the app repo → get the app-namespace sealed secret
3. Open a single PR that adds BOTH sealed secrets and flips enabled: true in values-contabo.yaml
4. Merge → ArgoCD applies → provisioning Job runs → DB role + database created

The key invariant: never flip enabled: true without the fuzeinfra-namespace sealed secret in the same PR.

4. Reference: mendys precedent (FuzeKeys #136)

Check FuzeKeys PR #136 for the exact pattern used for mendys — the sealed secret structure, the values-contabo.yaml change, and the commit order. Mirror that for fuzesales/fuzecontact/fuzeservice.

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Out of scope for this issue

• Creating the app-namespace sealed secrets for fuzesales/fuzecontact (already exist in their repos)
• Creating the app-namespace sealed secret for fuzeservice (tracked in FuzeService issue)

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STATE:

• Ad-hoc secrets currently live on cluster (will survive until namespace is deleted)
• provisioning Job ran successfully after ad-hoc fix — all roles/DBs now exist
• This issue seals the fix permanently into git

[claude]

Claude finished @izzywdev's task in 10m 0s —— View job • claude/issue-228-20260709-1748 • Create PR ➔

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Done — service-DB credentials sealed permanently into GitOps ✅

Root-cause correction: the three SealedSecrets this issue asked me to add (fuzesales/fuzecontact/fuzeservice-db-credentials) were already committed to deploy/sealed-secrets/ in 7f25587 (PR #184, alongside mendys) — strict-scoped, password key, fuzeinfra ns. Part 1 was already complete.

The thing that would actually let the wedge recur was still there: nothing reconciled deploy/sealed-secrets/ onto the cluster. fuzeinfra-prod only syncs helm/fuzeinfra, and terraform cherry-picks specific Argo apps — so the live Secrets were ad-hoc kubectl create secret and the committed manifests were orphaned. On a namespace delete / from-scratch reprovision, the SealedSecrets are never applied → the provisioning Job wedges again (CreateContainerConfigError). Files-in-git are necessary but not sufficient; the durable fix is a GitOps reconciler.

What I did

• Confirmed the 3 sealed secrets already exist in git (part 1 done)
• argocd/applications/fuzeinfra-sealed-secrets.yaml — directory-type Argo Application (path: deploy/sealed-secrets, recurse) into ns fuzeinfra, project fuzeinfra, automated{prune,selfHeal}. Argo now self-heals the SealedSecrets onto the cluster; the controller decrypts them into real Secrets before the provisioning Job needs them — including after a full namespace re-create. This is what makes the fix durable.
• terraform/contabo/provisioning.tf — wired the new app into both null_resource blocks + a filesha256 trigger, so a from-scratch VPS reprovision registers it (faithful mirror of the existing sealed-secrets-controller pattern; terraform fmt clean).
• scripts/seed-service-db.sh — idempotent bootstrap: generates a 32‑char alphanumeric password (CLAUDE.md gotcha), seals it offline via seal-secret.sh → deploy/sealed-secrets/<svc>-db-credentials.yaml, prints the password + the "enable in the same PR" next steps. Refuses to clobber an existing manifest (--force to reseal for rotation). Smoke-tested: help/validation/idempotency all pass.
• docs/CONSUMER_ONBOARDING_SHARED_CLUSTER.md §4 — documented the two-secret pattern, the 4-step flow, and the load-bearing invariant: never flip enabled: true without the fuzeinfra-namespace SealedSecret in the same PR.

I reused the repo's canonical scripts/seal-secret.sh (offline, published public cert, strict scope) rather than reinventing sealing — matching the mendys/FuzeKeys #136 precedent.

⚠️ One operator action for the CURRENT cluster (not the DR path)

On a fresh namespace the controller creates the Secrets cleanly, so the DR scenario is fully covered by this PR. But the live cluster already has the 4 Secrets created imperatively — the sealed-secrets controller won't take over a Secret it doesn't own. So after merge, to hand them to GitOps ownership, a human should do a one-time adoption per secret (either annotate sealedsecrets.bitnami.com/managed: "true" or delete the plain Secret and let Argo/controller recreate it — safe, the SealedSecret encodes the same live password). I did not touch live prod (GitOps + no explicit instruction to reconcile imperatively).

_{· branch claude/issue-228-20260709-1748}